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The New Ice Age: The Dawn of Arctic
Shipping and Canada’s Fight for Sovereignty
Over the Northwest Passage
Caitlin O’Leary*
“Westward from the Davis Strait ’tis there ‘twas said to lie
The sea route to the Orient for which so many died;
Seeking gold and glory, leaving weathered, broken bones
And a long-forgotten lonely cairn of stones.”1
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I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, explorers have sought an Arctic shipping route
connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.2 An Arctic sea route
* Caitlin O’Leary, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2015, University of Miami
School of Law; B.A. 2012, Villanova University.
1. STAN ROGERS, Northwest Passage, on NORTHWEST PASSAGE (Fogarty’s Cove
Music 1981).
2. Kate Dailey, Franklin Expedition: Will we ever know what happened?, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 8, 2011, 7:44 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-14847091
(detailing British explorer Sir John Franklin’s 1845 expedition to find the Northwest
Passage that resulted in his and his 128 crewmen’s deaths).
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joining the world’s great oceans would facilitate faster travel and
more efficient shipping between Europe and North America. One
of the most popular of the proposed passages is the Northwest
Passage. The Northwest Passage connects the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans along the northern coast of North America through the
Canadian Arctic Archipelago.3 Five possible routes exist through
this waterway that is sandwiched between the Davis Strait and
Baffin Bay in the east and the Bering Strait in the west.4 The first
full transit of the Northwest Passage occurred over a three-year
journey from 1903-1906 by Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen.5
Amundsen’s excursion showed the promise of a navigable Arctic
shipping route stuck in the confines of the harsh climate. Changes
in climate throughout the 21st century, along with technological
advances, have allowed the main barrier of Arctic shipping—ice—
to disappear, leaving a sea route ripe for future commercial
shipping.6
On September 27, 2013, the historic first shipping voyage
across the Northwest Passage occurred.7 A Danish bulk cargo
ship, the MV Nordic Orion, made its way through the Northwest
Passage using it as a transit lane while carrying 73,500 tons of
coal from Vancouver, Canada to Finland.8 This route allowed the
ship to save time, fuel and carbon dioxide emissions.9 By traveling
though the Northwest Passage instead of the Panama Canal, the
MV Nordic Orion took 1,000 nautical miles off of its route and car-
ried 25% more cargo because it is not held to the disbursement
restrictions in the canal.10 The projections for fuel savings alone
are estimated around $80,000.00.11 The MV Nordic Orion’s trip
produced savings in almost every area imaginable.
The transit of the MV Nordic Orion marks an important place
in maritime history. Arctic shipping is now a reality. The advent
3. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT 20
(2009), available at http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report
_2nd_print.pdf.
4. MATTHEW CARNAGHAN ET AL., CANADIAN ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY (2006), available
at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb0561-e.htm.
5. See supra note 3.
6. Id. at 2.
7. Press Release, Nordic Bulk Carriers A/S, Historic Sea Route Opens Through
Canadian Arctic Waters (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://www.nordicbulkcarriers
.com/nwp-project.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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of Arctic shipping could usher in a new era of trade. However,
despite the potential economic benefits of Arctic shipping, there
are many uncertainties that follow. The Northwest Passage is sit-
uated in the Arctic water above Canada.12 Canada claims the
Northwest Passage as internal Canadian water.13 The United
States, however, views the Northwest Passage as international
water and contends that freedom of the sea applies. Before the MV
Nordic’s voyage, there were no real consequences to the opposing
views of the allied nations. Now that Arctic shipping is coming to
fruition, alliances may soon be tested, raising important concerns
for national sovereignty, international relations, and the fragile
Arctic ecosystem.
This note will analyze the Canada’s legal ownership of the
Northwest Passage, the current law governing the Arctic, other
nation’s Arctic claims, and what Canada should do to secure the
Northwest Passage under international law.
II. CANADA’S CLAIM TO THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE
Throughout much of Canada’s history, its northernmost bor-
der was not challenged. Canada has long used rhetoric describing
parts of the Arctic as an extension of Canada, but historically
there has been no development or presence securing the claim.14
In 1949, Canada’s ambassador to the United States, Lester Pear-
son, defined the Canadian Arctic as “not only Canada’s northern
mainland, but the islands and the frozen sea north of the main-
land between the meridians of its east and west boundaries,
extended to the North Pole.”15 This early Arctic claim was an
assertion of jurisdiction over the islands, and it is not clear if
Canada intended for it to extend to water in the region.16
However, when the supertanker Manhattan bearing the
United States’ flag attempted to cross part of the Northwest Pas-
sage in 1969, Canada clearly asserted its position as owner of the
Arctic waterway.17 Canada formally declared the Northwest Pas-
sage as its own territory and passed anti-pollution legislation over
the Arctic waters as a way to assert its control.18 Since then,
12. See generally Andrea Charron, The Northwest Passage in Context 41,
CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL, (Winter 2005-2006).
13. Id. at 42.
14. Id. at 41.
15. Id. at 42.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 43.
18. See Charron, supra note 12.
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Canada has increasingly become more vocal about its stake in the
Arctic. In 2010, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper pro-
claimed that Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is a “non-negotia-
ble” priority of the nation.19 However, it should be noted, that this
strong rhetoric is still absent a strong presence in the region.
The United States does not agree with Canada’s assertion of
control over the Arctic waters of the Northwest Passage.20 The
United States avouches that the water meets the classification of
international water and freedom of the sea applies.21  Other
nations, such as Japan and the countries of European Union, have
adopted the United States’ view that the Northwest Passage is
international water.22 The dispute of the ownership of the North-
west Passage is complicated by the absence of a cohesive legal doc-
trine to solve the discrepancies.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
The Arctic is currently governed by a patchwork of interna-
tional law. Different treaties and organizations attempt to regu-
late the Arctic, but they fail to produce a unified doctrine. There
are three significant sources of law for the regulations of the
Northwest Passage: the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, the Arctic Council, and 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agree-
ment between the United States and Canada.
a. The United Nations Convention on the Law and
Sea
The United Nations Conventions of the Law and Sea
(“UNCLOS”) was created to standardize the international
approach to the oceans and waterways. UNCLOS provides guide-
lines for territorial claims, mineral extraction, pollution, marine
tort claims, and many other aspects of international maritime
law.23 UNCLOS is largely an adoption of international common
law.24 All of the Arctic nations adopted UNCLOS with the excep-
19. Arctic Sovereignty ‘non-negotiable’: Harper, CBC NEWS, (last visited Aug. 20,
2010), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/arctic-sovereignty-non-negotiable-harper-1.866
786.
20. See Charron, supra note 12.
21. Id. at 42.
22. See CARNAGHAN, supra note 4.
23. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application of United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea—Global Cases, 21 A.L.R. 2d 109 (2007).
24. Id. at 7.
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tion of the United States.25 However, because of its close adher-
ence to customary law, the United States is largely in compliance
with UNCLOS by default.26
UNCLOS provides the international forum to adjudicate sov-
ereignty claims of nations.27 Generally, a state has permission to
exercise sovereignty up to 200 nautical miles from its baseline,
forming an Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) for the nation.28 The
EEZ gives the nation the ability to utilize the resources found
within that area. A nation can further extend the EEZ by way of
its continental shelf.29 UNCLOS describes the continental shelf as:
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend
beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolonga-
tion of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin
does not extend up to that distance.30
A nation with exclusive rights over the continental shelves is
allowed the sole extraction of resources and control.31
Determining if the EEZ extends into the continental shelf is a
challenging process. The United Nations established United
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which
is a body that recommends and reviews territory claims that
states make for continental self. After a country ratifies UNCLOS,
the nation has 10 years to submit its territorial claim to the
Commission.32
UNCLOS views internal waters as a continuation of a state’s
land territory.33 A nation has the ability to set laws, regulate use,
exploit resources, and maintain absolute control over internal
water.34 The degree of control that a country can assert over a
body of water hinges on if it is defined as territorial water.35 Terri-
25. Tessa Mendez, Thin Ice, Shifting Geopolitics: the Legal Implications of Arctic
Ice Melt, 38 DEV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 527 (Summer 2010).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 543.
28. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 57, 76, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
29. Mendez, supra note 25, at 527.
30. UNCLOS, supra note 28, art. 76.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Mendez, supra note 25, at 527.
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torial waters exist up to 12 nautical miles from a country’s base-
line and the state can set laws, regulate use, and draw resources.36
The main difference between territorial and internal waters is the
right of innocent passage.37 If water is classified under UNCLOS
as territorial, rather than internal, then all foreign vessels have
the right to traverse the water absent fishing, pollution, espio-
nage, or firing weapons.38 If a body of water is classified as archi-
pelago water, then UNCLOS designates it as a hybrid of internal
and territorial water.39 A nation is still granted the utmost control
and sovereignty of the water that internal waters permits, but the
right of innocent passage still exists.40
Canada ratified UNCLOS in 2003.41 In December 2013, on the
10-year deadline, Canada submitted its territorial claim to estab-
lished United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continen-
tal Shelf.42 Canada’s expansive claim, which will be discussed
later in the note, has not been ruled on. The recommendation of
the Commission will have a large impact on the future of Canada’s
Arctic policy. It should be noted, however, that the United States,
Canada’s biggest challenger to the Northwest Passage, is not a
party to UNLCOS. Canada’s control over the Northwest Passage
will pivot upon the definition that is given to its water by the
international governing body. Adherence to the definition granted
to the Northwest Passage may depend on whether a nation is a
party to UNCLOS.
If there is a dispute in a territorial claim, UNCLOS also
allows for resolutions under Part XV of the treaty.43 UNCLOS
allows a nation who signed, ratified, or acceded to UNCLOS to
have disputes decided over an interpretation of UNCLOS.44 The
country may chose to find resolution by either the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Jus-
tice, ad hoc arbitration, or a special arbitral tribunal.45 Disputes
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Charlie Gills, Who Owns the North Pole?, MACLEAN’S (Jul. 25, 2011), http://
www2.macleans.ca/2011/07/25/who-owns-the-north-pole.
42. UNCLOS, supra note 28, at part XV.
43. Id.
44. Permanent Court for Arbitration. Ad Hoc Under Annex VII of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=1288.
45. Id.
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over territory under UNCLOS often take years to decide.46
If Canada’s claim over the Arctic, including the Northwest
Passage, is approved, then it will have legitimate legal backing
behind its claim of ownership over Northwest Passage’s water.
While the United States is not a party of UNCLOS, the backing of
the United Nations will provide strong allies for Canada if other
nations attempt to infringe on its Arctic claim. However, if a dis-
pute were to grow between the United States and Canada, they
lack the proper venue of the UNCLOS tribunal options to find res-
olution to their issues, opening up the possibility of non-diplo-
matic forum for dispute resolution.
b. Arctic Council
The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental body established
for the nations who have a vested interest in the Arctic. In 1996,
the Ottawa Declaration established the Arctic Council as a means
for cooperation between the Arctic states.47 The Arctic Council is
comprised of Canada, Russia, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Den-
mark, Iceland, and the United States.48 Organizations of indige-
nous people from the Arctic nations can maintain spots as
permanent participants on the Arctic Council, but not members.49
The Arctic Athabaskan Council (“AAC”) is the permanent partici-
pant of the Arctic Council that represents the interests of Ameri-
can and Canadian First Nation members. The AAC now
represents an estimated 45,000 people from the Arctic region.50
Nations that are interested in the Arctic but that do not border it,
such as China, are also allowed permanent participant spots.51
The Arctic Council is a cooperative body that functions to pro-
duce policy. In 1996, the Arctic Council produced its first binding
treaty of a search and rescue agreement between the nations.52
The treaty divided the Arctic into eight zones and tasked each par-
46. See Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago, 27 R.I.A.A. 147 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006), which was
instituted in February 2004 and decided by a final award rendered on April 11, 2006.
47. About the Arctic Council (April 7, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/index
.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/about-arctic-council.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Permanent Participants (April 27, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/index
.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants.
51. Id.
52. Steven Lee Myers, Cooperation Is Pledged by Nations of the Arctic, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/world/europe/13arctic.html?_r
=1&.
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ticipant to coordinate rescue missions in their respective zone.53
The Arctic Council successfully produced agreements between the
nations on search and rescue, pollution clean up, and basic envi-
ronmental standards. Regarding the more contested issues, such
as territory claims or shipping rights, the Arctic Council has been
silent. It is unknown whether the Arctic Council will react to acts
of aggression or territorial claims within the Arctic.
An attempt to approach the territorial claims among Arctic
nations occurred in 2008 at the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulis-
sat, Greenland.54  The conference exclusively featured the five
coastal states of the Arctic: Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark,
and the United States.55 The conference produced the Ilulissat
Declaration that reiterated the need for cooperation between the
Arctic states for environmental protection, rescue, and the sharing
of information. The five nations pledged they “will work to
strengthen this cooperation, which is based on mutual trust and
transparency, inter alia, through timely exchange of data and
analyses.”56 There was no mention in the declaration for the settle-
ment of overlapping territory claims that still exist today. The
Illulissat Declaration failed to produce the much-needed territo-
rial clarity for the Arctic. Attempts at an intergovernmental
organization for the Arctic have failed to produce policy beyond
the areas of scientific research, search and rescue, and pollution.
c. 1988 Cooperation Agreement
As stated above, the height of Arctic tension between the
United States and Canada occurred in 1985 when an ice breaker
bearing the United States’ flag attempted to cross the Northwest
Passage.57 This prompted Canada to publicly declare the North-
west Passage, and all water within the outer boundaries of the
Canadian Archipelago, as internal water.58 The United States,
however, refused to accept this claim. The United States has
taken the position, and still does to this day, that the Northwest
Passage is international water and is subject to the concept of
freedom of the sea. The two allies attempted to ameliorate their
53. Id.
54. The Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference (2008), http://www.ocean
law.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Michael Sternheim, Regulating the Northwest Passage, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 173
(2010).
58. Id.
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incompatible positions with the 1988 Cooperation Agreement.59
The agreement calls for cooperation in navigation with ice-
breakers and with sharing information.60 It also provides that all
of the United States’ navigation of this area will be done with con-
sent of Canada. However, the agreement states “nothing in this
agreement of cooperative endeavor between Arctic neighbors and
friends nor any practice thereunder affects the respective posi-
tions of the Governments of the United States and of Canada on
the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas or their respec-
tive positions regarding third parties.”61 The agreement between
Canada and the United States is one that has allowed for the
sharing of information, research, and development.  With regards
to the more contentious issue of ownership, the 1988 Cooperation
agreement falls short; it is essentially an agreement to disagree.
As the Arctic ice continues to melt and arctic shipping continues to
emerge, the agreement to cooperate may no longer be feasible.
Canada has attempted to assert dominance over the North-
west Passage in every aspect of international law that it has par-
taken in. Canada is a signatory to UNCLOS and has recently
submitted its vast territorial claim encompassing water up to the
North Pole; Canada is a leader on the Arctic Council; and, despite
the inconclusive nature of the 1988 Cooperation Agreement,
Canada structured the agreement to allow it to be the dominant
nation over the United States by requiring Canadian consent for
United States’ transit.  Canada continues to bolster its claim by
weaving Arctic sovereignty into its nation’s narrative, such as
when the Prime Minister described it as a “non-negotiable” prior-
ity for the nation.62 However, much of Canada’s action is just talk,
and while the amalgamation of international law tends to lean
towards its favor, the existence of differing opinions still leaves
the sovereignty of the Northwest Passage undecided. Canada
needs action and development to accompany its words, as there
are other nations that are developing the Arctic at astonishing
rates with presences that may silence Canada’s rhetoric.
IV. RUSSIA’S ARCTIC EXAMPLE
Russia is actively developing the Arctic territory around it.
The Arctic Ocean is comprised of two sea routes: the Northwest
59. Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, U.S.-Can, Jan. 11, 1988, T.I.A.S. 11565.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 19.
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Passage and the Northern Sea Route.63 The Northern Sea Route,
sometimes referred to as the Northeast Passage, is the Arctic-
shipping route that follows Russia’s northern coast. Russia’s claim
to the Northern Sea Route is not as contested as the Northwest
Passage as it more clearly falls within Russia’s EEZ. Russia made
its bid to UNCLOS for Arctic territory four years after its ratifica-
tion of UNCLOS, only to have the Commission send it back for
lack of scientific proof.64 Russia’s Arctic enthusiasm was not
slowed by the return of its UNCLOS bid.
Russia continues to this day to be the most active Arctic
nation. Even though its latest UNCLOS bid has not been
approved, the Russian government is taking action with the
assumption that it will be. In 2007, it was discovered that Russia
had taken steps to mark its prospective territory by placing a tita-
nium Russian flag on the seafloor at the North Pole.65 Canada’s
Arctic position of cooperation, compliance, and rhetoric are in
stark contrast to Russia’s position of independence, innovation,
and action. The UNCLOS Committee factors in national presence
when deciding boundaries that gives significance to Russia’s pos-
sessive actions.
In 2011, Russian President Vladmir Putin expressed his
desire to turn the Northern Sea Route into a trade route of “inter-
national significance and scale.”66 Russia has a growing permit
system that allows ships to cross the Northern Sea Route. In 2012,
Russia granted 46 permits; by mid-September 2013, Russia had
already granted 531 permits for that year.67 An example of this
occurred on August 8, 2013, when the Chinese cargo ship Yong
Sheng embarked from northeastern China to the Netherlands by
way of the Northern Sea Route with a scheduled voyage 13 days
less than the traditional voyage through the Straits of Malacca
and the Suez Canal.68  Russia is actively building its infrastruc-
ture to attract more Arctic travel. Russia currently has 16 deep-
63. Barret Weber, Increased Shipping in the International Arctic? An Overview, 43
J. MAR. L. & COM. 301, 306 (2012).
64. Charlie Gillis, Who owns the North Pole?, MACLEAN’S (Jul. 25, 2011), http://
www2.macleans.ca/2011/07/25/who-owns-the-north-pole.
65. Id.
66. Nadia Rodova, Russia’s Northern Sea Route: Global Implications, PLATTS
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.platts.com/news-feature/2013/oil/euro-nsr/index.
67. Id.
68. Mia Bennett, Chinese cargo vessel takes to the Arctic’s burgeoning Northern
Sea Route, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (August 24, 2013), http://www.adn.com/article/
20130824/chinese-cargo-vessel-takes-arctics-burgeoning-northern-sea-route.
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\46-1\IAL103.txt unknown Seq: 11 12-MAR-15 9:16
2014] THE NEW ICE AGE 127
water ports in the Arctic and nuclear icebreakers on patrol.69 In
November 2013, Russia debuted a new nuclear powered ice-
breaker that is one of the largest of its kind.70
Contrast that with Canada, which has no ports above the Arc-
tic Circle and icebreakers operating with aged technology.71  With
no Arctic territory officially claimed by any country under
UNCLOS, it seems that the Arctic is turning into a wild west for
taking. According to the World Bank, in 2013, Canada’s military
budget expenditure, as measured by percent of GDP, was just
1.0%; United States’ military budget was 3.5 %; and Russia’s mili-
tary budget was 4.2%.72 Canada is not only behind other Arctic
nations in technology and action, but also on the resources needed
for Arctic control.
V. WHY CANADA NEEDS TO TAKE CONTROL
The voyage of the MV Nordic Orion marked the first time a
cargo ships safely traveled through the Northwest Passage. The
unprecedented global climate changes appear to aid maritime
ambitions. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
issues an annual “Arctic Report Card.”73 The trend over the
annual reports is a “persistent warming trend that began over 30
years ago”74 Arctic sea ice is described in terms of extent.75 Arctic
ice in the summer of 2013 had a minimum extent that was 1.12
million km2 below the 1981-2010 average minimum ice extent.76
Canada’s apprehension to assert itself over its Arctic territorial
claim does not fit well with the aggressive nature of the melting
Arctic ice.
a. Benefits of Arctic Shipping
As the MV Nordic Orion’s voyage through the Northwest Pas-
sage illustrated, there is tremendous cost-effective benefits to be
69. Chris Sorensen, Frozen out of Arctic Shipping, MACLEAN’S (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://www2.macleans.ca/2013/10/31/frozen-out-of-arctic-shipping/.
70. Russia lays down world’s largest icebreaker, RT (Nov. 5, 2013, 9:31 AM), http://
rt.com/news/world-biggest-icebreaker-russia-275/.
71. Sorensen, supra note 69.
72. Military Expenditure, THE WORLD BANK available at http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS.
73. Executive Summary, Arctic Report Card: Update for 2013 (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard/exec_summary.html.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Sea Ice, Arctic Report Card: Update for 2013 (December 17, 2013), http://www
.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard/sea_ice.html.
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gained from Arctic shipping. Beyond cutting down miles, emis-
sions, and costs, ships using the Northwest Passage can avoid the
risky Horn of Africa that has recently been plagued with pirates.77
It is believed that Arctic shipping has the ability to decrease East-
West transit time between Europe, Asia, and North America by up
to 40%, and in doing so will reduce fuel consumption and carbon
emissions.78 It is slightly ironic to travel through the Northwest
Passage, which is largely made possible by global warming, can be
used to decrease carbon emissions and pollution in the future.
Canadian control over the Northwest Passage will allow Canada
the ability to control the emerging shipping market just above its
borders.
National shipping routes provide tremendous economic bene-
fits for countries. Currently, Egypt’s Suez Canal brings in around
$5 billion in revenue for Egypt a year accounts for 10 percent of
the world’s shipping traffic.79 The Suez Canal is an extreme exam-
ple juxtaposed with current state of the Northwest Passage; nev-
ertheless, it shows the immense financial gain available from a
national shipping route.
b. Environmental Risks
The ability of Arctic shipping to potentially decrease carbon
emissions worldwide should not overlook the danger of disturbing
the fragile, untouched ecosystem of the Arctic. Maritime travel
has the risk of bringing invasive species and pathogens to the Arc-
tic ecosystem.80 As the Northwest Passage is largely unregulated
right now, there is no protection against rogue ships disrupting
the ecosystem of the area. Canadian regulation over the North-
west Passage will allow them to decide which portions of the
Northwest Passage are open for transit and which should remain
closed.81 For example, part of the Northwest Passage is known as
77. See Peter Chalk, Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and
Responses, 16 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 89, 90 (Spring/Summer 2010) (discussing the re-
emergence of maritime piracy on the Horn of Africa where in 2008 and 2009 46% of all
global incidents of piracy were recorded).
78. Heather A. Conley et. al., Arctic Economics in the 21st Century, Center for
Strategic and Int’l Studies, 32 (July 2013), http://csis.org/files/publication/130710_
Conley_ArcticEconomics_WEB.pdf.
79. Julie Berwald, Under the Ships in the Suez Canal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/opinion/under-the-ships-in-the-suez-canal.html?
_r=0.
80. See Conley, supra note 78, at 39.
81. Adam Lajeunesse, A New Mediterranean? Arctic Shipping Prospects for the
21st Century, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 521 (2013).
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Lancaster Sound.82 Lancaster Sound functions as a migration
route for 85% of the world’s narwhal.83 Increased traffic in this
section of the Northwest Passage could have tremendous and
potentially devastating effects on an entire species. Sovereignty
for Canada will mean that it can control which vessels can enter
the Northwest Passage and which channels of they will use.
Manmade disasters from increased transit also pose a grave
environmental risk. The Arctic Council has worked together to set
up some standard clean up protocol for the Arctic, but Canadian
governance of the Northwest Passage would allow them to set
even more stringent standards if they see fit. It should also be
noted that records show Russia has deposited solid radioactive
wastes in the seabed of the Arctic region from 1959 to 1993.84
There are a lot of high stakes for this untouched and unregulated
part of the world, and indecisive international politics may not
serve as the most effective model for the potentially traumatizing
impact to the Arctic environment.
c. Voice for Canadian Aboriginals
The development of the Arctic will have far reaching effects
beyond just maritime gains. It is estimated that there are cur-
rently about 113,000 Canadians living in the area of the Canadian
Arctic with approximately 64,506 of those Canadians being
Aboriginal natives to the region.85 The natives to the Canadian
Arctic are mostly comprised of the First Nations, Inuit, and Metis
people.86 The Canadian Aboriginals have resided in the area since
prehistoric times, utilizing land stretching all the way up to ice
over the Northwest Passage to sustain their livelihood.87 The his-
torical ties to the region give credence to Canada’s claim of owner-
ship, but it should also foster a duty to the Canadian government
to protect historic land of these communities.
The Arctic Council has allotted spots for Native groups to
have seats as permanent participants. This means that they do
not have voting rights. There are currently six indigenous people’s
organizations on the council: Aleut International Association, Arc-
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Yvonne Chi, Oceans in the Nuclear Age: The Need for Comprehensive
International Environmental Regulations, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 517 (2013).
85. Kevin Du, Santa Claus is Canadian, Eh! Canada’s Ice Rush to Claim the
North Pole, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 832 (Winter 2013).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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tic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in International, Inuit Circumpo-
lar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous People of the
North, and the Saami Council.88 However, these groups of people
are very dependant on using soft power. Canadian control of the
Northwest Passage and international recognition will give more
control to the Aboriginal Canadians who have the most substan-
tial claim to the land. The 64,506 Aboriginals in the Canadian
Arctic will participate in a national government that controls their
historic land and waterways. The Canadian indigenous commu-
nity will not longer have to lobby at the international community
for recognition, but will now have a voice in the proceedings and
development of the land that belongs to them. Canada needs to
flex its sovereignty over the Arctic claim, not only for the vast eco-
nomic benefits to come, but because they are in the best position to
be stewards of their citizen’s land and culture. Russia, under Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin, has begun cracking down on indigenous
rights in the Arctic of Russia.89 Canada’s preservation of native
culture and rights could provide a positive model for other Arctic
nations to follow.
VI. CANADIAN GOVERNANCE OVER THE
NORTHWEST PASSAGE
Canada has loudly proclaimed its believed possession of the
Northwest Passage and has strategically worked with interna-
tional law to make itself a leader in compliance with the law. The
voyage of the MV Nordic Orion, coupled with the success of the
Northern Sea Route, shows that Arctic shipping is possible. What
distinguishes the Northwest Passage from the Northern Sea
Route, however, is the lack of infrastructure in the Northwest
Passage. If Canada wants to become the Arctic maritime super-
power that it strives to be under international law, then it must
create the infrastructure not only to facilitate the growth, but also
to protect it from other nations. Currently there are 66 combat
ready icebreakers divided amongst 6 Arctic nations.90 Russia’s
88. Saami Council, POST ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/saami-council/123-resour
ces/about/permanent-participants.
89. Mike Blanchfield, Canada, Russia Work Well in Arctic Despite Other
Differences: John Baird, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 11, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost
.ca/2014/01/11/canada-russia-arctic_n_4580352.html.
90. Interview by Tom Clark with Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State,
in Ottawa, Can. (Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/2009
2013clinton/rm/2010/03/139207.htm.
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placement of its flag on the North Pole is evidence of its creeping
maritime claims. China, a non-arctic state, operates the largest
non-nuclear icebreaker in the world and in 2009 China’s State
Council approved the construction of a $300 million icebreaker.91
If Canada does not have the resources to regulate the passage, its
sovereignty will be infringed upon. This may also have trickling
effects to the national security of Canada as Russia and China
become the dominant Arctic forces.
Canadian governance over the Northwest Passage has the
potential to usher in great financial and security benefits, but
there is a cost that Canada must provide in exchange. Canada will
be responsible for safe travels through the passage, which will
require ice-reporting systems and icebreaker services clear the
way for other ships.92 Accurate ice reporting is essential for safe
travel in the Arctic. This has required Canada to invest in more
ice breakers and in better reporting systems, as the Canadian Ice
Service only has one aircraft that is limited in the number of
hours that it can fly for radar ice reconnaissance due to its limited
budget.93 Ensuring the safe passage of ships will also require more
general infrastructure improvements. Suggestions to the improve-
ments that Canada needs include radio and radar beacons, lighted
marks, radar reflectors and various buoys to mark off safe pas-
sage” and increased mapping.94 However, these are just the
requirements for providing for safe passages. If Canada wants to
become a true maritime giant in the Arctic, it will need to develop
ports and fueling stations as well. An advantage to creating these
services is that it gives Canada increased control in the area as
they will also now be able to deny the services to unwanted
travelers.
VII. CANADA’S OPTIONS FOR CONTROL
a. Canadian-American Arctic Cooperation
In recent years, the rhetoric of the United States regarding
the Arctic appears to have shifted. A March 29, 2010, Tom Clark
of Canada’s CTV Power interviewed then-Secretary of State Hil-
lary Clinton and shed insight into possible changes of Arctic Pol-
icy. When Clark asked Secretary of State Clinton if she could
91. China’s Artic Ambitions, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2010), http://ideas.blogs.nytimes
.com/2010/05/24/chinas-arctic-ambitions/.
92. See Lajeunesse, supra note 81.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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foresee a time when the United States might recognize Canadian
sovereignty over the Northwest Passage in exchange for joint
management of the water, Clinton responded, “I think that’s what
we’re beginning to discussing seriously.”95 While Clinton’s answer
is vague, the ambiguity of the answer is different than previous
definitive declarations from the United States about Canada’s
ownership of the Northwest Passage.96 Clinton further empha-
sized the need for cooperation in the Arctic, specifically terms of
search-and-rescue and sharing information.97 Clinton stated that
the United States is trying to avoid an arms race for the Arctic
and is now giving much attention to the Arctic.98
President Obama has furthered the United States’ emphasis
on the Arctic. On July 10, 2010, President Barack Obama issued
Executive Order 13547 Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts,
and Great Lakes.99 Executive Order 13547 calls for promoting the
United States’ maritime policy by “cooperating and exercising
leadership at an international level” and “pursuing the United
States’ accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.”100 This, again,
shows the executive branch’s commitment to the Arctic and fed-
eral policy recognizing the importance of cooperation on the global
issue.
However, this change in rhetoric might be the only real
change in United States’ Arctic Policy. In 2012, a Congress voted
against ratifying UNCLOS.101 The United States still does not rec-
ognize of the Northwest Passage as Canadian waters. However, in
February 2014, the United States announced that Secretary of
Sate John Kerry will name a high-level individual to serve in the
new position of Arctic ambassador.102 This further illustrates Pres-
95. See supra note 90.
96. As recent as 2006, David Wilkins, the United States Ambassador to Canada,
denied any international support for Canadian baselines and reasserted that the
Northwest Passage is an international straight; see Letter from David Wilkins,
United States Ambassador to Canada, to Peter Boehm, Assistant Deputy Minister, N.
Am., Dep’t of Foreign Affairs & Int’l Trade (Can.) (October 27, 2006) available at
www.state.gov/documents/organization/98836.pdf.
97. See supra note 90.
98. Id.
99. Exec. Order No. 13547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023 (Jul. 22, 2010).
100. Id.
101. Melissa Renee Pegna, U.S. Arctic Policy: The Need to Ratify a Modified
UNCLOS and Secure a Military Presence in the Arctic, 44 J. MAR. L. & COM.  169, 176
(2013).
102. Becky Bohrer, State Department Plans Arctic Ambassador, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/state-department-plans-arctic-ambassador-19
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ident Obama’s emphasis on Arctic policy and the attention the
United States is directing towards this region.
Almost all of the multinational agreements over the Arctic
use the phrase cooperation. The Arctic Council, Ilulissat Declara-
tion, and the 1988 Cooperation Agreement all illustrate the need
for cooperation in this unchartered territory. It is together that
the best environmental protection, safety patrol, and scientific
exploration can come. The United States and Canada are perhaps
two of the closest allies on the global stage. They both will benefit
greatly from an Arctic shipping route as it will give rise increased
commerce and security in North America. Beyond the benefits, the
United States and Canada face similar threats from Arctic ship-
ping. Both nations may face national security threats and disrup-
tion to the fragile ecosystem as a result of the newly opened
northern frontier.  It is in Canada and the United States’ best
interests to secure the Arctic and ensure that there is a compre-
hensive governance system in place instead of the loosely overlap-
ping, unenforceable international treaties.
Based on the more cooperative tone that the United States
has taken in recent presidential administrations regarding Cana-
dian governance of the Northwest Passage, Canada should look
into moving forward into a new or modified joint agreement with
the United States regarding the Northwest Passage.
b. International Treaty
One of the biggest hurdles to Canadian sovereignty in the
Arctic is the absence of uniform law for the territorial claims.
Though the United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS, recogni-
tion from the United Nations regarding its territorial claims could
give Canada the sovereignty over the Northwest Passage that it
has long dreamed of. If Canada is able to establish an EEZ it will
have official recognition and sovereign rights to the waters within
that zone. It must do this based upon the guidelines set forth in
UNCLOS. Under UNCLOS, if other nations do not adhere to
Canada’s claim, then Canada will have the ability to bring suit in
the International Court of Justice.103 Under Canada’s UNCLOS
claim, it will be allowed to establish twelve-miles of sovereignty
over its coastal waters.104 Further, Canada can claim sovereignty
5133637.html;_ylt=AgBVnHAkyCE6LUtqDJsw2hrQtDMD;_ylu=X3oDMTBsdmNod
WplBGNvbG8DYmYxBHBvcwMzBHNlYwNzcg—.
103. See supra note 44.
104. See Mendez, supra note 25.
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over 200 nautical miles from its shores.105 A special provision in
UNCLOS, Annex II, allows states with claims in the Arctic to
increase sovereignty claims beyond the 200-mile boundary when
they submit claims supported by scientific evidence to show that
the Continental shelf exceeds the 200 nautical miles.106
After waiting its full 10 years to submit its claim to UNCLOS
and gathering extensive scientific research, Canada submitted its
bid in December 2013.107 The territory that Canada claimed was
roughly 1.75 million km2, which is equivalent to 20% of Canada’s
land mass or roughly three prairie provinces in size.108 Canada’s
bid is based upon significant research of measuring the depths of
the seabed floor, the thickness of the sediment, and the distances
of continental slopes.109 As mentioned above, Russia’s UNCLOS
bid was rejected from lack of scientific evidence. Instead of devot-
ing the 10 year gap to gaining time and money for research, Rus-
sia harnessed its efforts towards the development of ports and
icebreakers.
Getting approval from UNCLOS regarding the territory could
give Canada the legitimacy it needs to protect its claim and could
aid in embracing the dawn of Arctic shipping. However, UNCLOS
claims take a long time for approval. As Canada continues to sit in
limbo for approval, Russia is developing the Northern Sea Route
at astonishing rates. Canada’s best measure is to unite with the
United States for the immediate future and operate with the
larger budget and support of an ally. Then, if Canada’s claim is
approved, it is not left unable to defend itself against other Arctic
nations.
105. See supra note 28.
106. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 10, 1982), http://www.un.org/
depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.
107. Michelle Zillio, Shelf watch 2013: Canada set to claim massive new seabed
territory, IPOLITICS (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.ipolitics.ca/2013/01/05/shelf-watch-
2013-canada-set-to-claim-massive-new-seabed-territory/.
108. Id.
109. Id.
